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CRIMINAL LAW
FRAUD AND CORRUPTION AGAINST
THE GOVERNMENT: A PROPOSED
STATUTE TO ESTABLISH A
TAXPAYER REMEDY
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY*
Fraud against governments is as old as government itself. Reports
of corrupt dealings date back to Biblical times and ancient Athens.'
Given the size of the United States government, it is hardly surprising
that it, too, would be plagued by fraud. What is surprising though, is
the magnitude of the government's losses. It is estimated that the
United States Treasury is bilked out of between $25 and $70 billion a
year.2 In this era of budgetary austerity, it is imperative that action be
taken to recover the lost funds and to deter future fraud.
Currently, the entire responsibility for enforcement rests with the
federal government, primarily the United States Department of Justice.
While government efforts are laudable, inherently they are capable of
dealing with only a fraction of the problem.3 The magnitude of the
fraud far exceeds the resources that conceivably could be devoted to
civil and criminal prosecutions. Combating government fraud requires
the development of new strategies and techniques.
One approach is to permit taxpayers to bring civil suit on behalf of
the government to recover money lost through fraud. Individual citi-
* Assistant Professor, De Paul University College of Law. J.D., Harvard University 1978;
B.S., Northwestern University, 1975. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Mr.
Stephen Sherry for his valuable research assistance and thanks his colleagues William Mar-
shall and Jeffrey Shaman for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1 See Geis & Edelheitz, CnrninalLaw and Consumer Fraud- A Sociological View, 11 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 989, 990 (1973).
2 Chicago Tribune, Jan. 18, 1981, at 1, col. 1. See discussion accompanying notes 8-58,
infta .
3 A. BEQUAI, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A 20TH CENTURY CRISIS 150 (1978). See also
discussion accompanying notes 59-104 infta.
1482
TAXPAYER REMEDY
zens would become private attorneys general, supplementing the gov-
ernment's inherently limited prosecutorial resources.
The concept of such taxpayer suits is hardly novel. In England,
during the Middle Ages, a shortage of law enforcement officers was off-
set by creating authority for prosecutions by private litigants.4 In fact,
"[m]uch reliance was placed upon common informers to secure enforce-
ment of laws affecting public order and safety."'5 Likewise, during the
American Civil War, the exposure of massive fraud in the procurement
process led to the adoption of authority for suits by private citizens to
recover money for the government.6 Quite simply, one well-established
technique for increasing enforcement efforts is to allow taxpayer litiga-
tion on behalf of the government. Taxpayers, motivated by an opportu-
nity to receive a share of the judgment, would greatly supplant federal
law enforcement resources.
Unfortunately, today such suits by private citizens are not allowed.
Restrictive doctrines limiting who has standing to sue in federal court
preclude taxpayer actions except where they are specifically authorized
by statute.7 Currently, no statute exists to permit such litigation.
This article proposes that Congress enact a statute granting taxpay-
ers standing to sue to recover money for the government in cases of
fraud and corruption. Section I describes the need for such legislation.
The magnitude of fraud, the inadequacy of current criminal and civil
sanctions, and the desirability of taxpayer litigation are discussed in this
section. Section II details the current barriers to taxpayer class actions,
focusing both on restrictive standing doctrines and the absence of statu-
tory authority for private litigation. Finally, a suggested legislative ap-
proach is outlined and potential objections to it are analyzed.
I. GOVERNMENT FRAUD AND CORRUPTION: THE NEED FOR A
TAXPAYER REMEDY
A. THE MAGNITUDE OF FRAUD AND CORRUPTION AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT
The size and pervasiveness of the United States government has no
precedent in history. In 1980, the federal budget was over $579 billion.8
4 Note, Qui Tam Suits Under the Federal False Clains Act: Tool of the Prvate Litigant in Public
Actions, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 446, 451 (1972).
5 2 L. RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRA-
TION FROM 1750, 143 (1957).
6 False Claims Act of March 2, 1863, 12 Stat. 696, R.S. §§ 3490-94, § 438, codt.Wd as 31
U.S.C. § 231, et seq., as amended December 23, 1943. Authority for citizen suits was found in
R.S. § 3491, 31 U.S.C. § 232 (1976).
7 See discussion accompanying notes 145-215 infra.
8 Chicago Tribune, Jan. 18, 1981, at 10, col. 5. The estimate for government spending in
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Approximately 54 percent of this total represents payments to individu-
als and grants to states and localities.9 In 1978, direct transfer payments
accounted for $224 billion in annual spending, an amount that increases
annually.' 0 In addition, private industry receives billions of dollars each
year in exchange for goods and services provided under contracts with
the federal government."
Each dollar the government distributes creates an opportunity for
illicit profit by fraud. The General Accounting Office, after a compre-
hensive review of government programs concluded:
Opportunity for defrauding the government is virtually limitless because
of the number, variety, and value of federal programs . . . The involve-
ment of so much money, and so many people and institutions makes the
federal programs vulnerable to fraud. 12
The schemes developed to cheat the government are as varied as
the programs themselves. Government grants and contracts are ex-
ploited by false claims for benefits, payments for goods and services not
delivered, deliberate overcharging, collusion, kickbacks and bribery of
public officials. 13 The growth in government programs and regulations
has created a concommitant rise in fraud and corruption.
No precise measure of the dollar losses from fraud can be ob-
tained. 14 Difficulties in detection insure that only a small percentage of
graft ever will be uncovered. 15 Nonetheless, the magnitude of fraud can
be estimated. 16 The United States Department of Justice approximates
1981 is $662 billion. This compares to Federal spending of $194.9 billion in 1970. Id. See also
THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES: FISCAL YEAR 1981, 3-5.
9 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 9 (1978) [hereinafter cited as RE-
PORT TO THE CONGRESS]. In 1981, it is estimated that 58% of the Budget will be spent on
direct payments to individuals and grants to states and localities. BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 8, at M-2.
10 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 59 SURVEYS OF CURRENT BUSINESS 16 (July 1979).
11 A. BEQUAI, supra note 3, at 65; LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION,
THE INVESTIGATION OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 17 (1977).
12 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL AGENCIES CAN, AND SHOULD Do MORE
TO COMBAT FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS (Report to Congress by the Comptroller
General) 11 (1978) [hereinafter cited as AGENCIES CAN Do MORE].
13 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra, note 9, at ii. See discussion accompanying notes 20-
55 infira.
14 The General Accounting Office concluded that "no one knows the magnitude of the
fraud against the government." AGENCIES CAN Do MORE, supra note 12, at 1.
15 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 9; Chicago Sun Times, May 8, 1981, at 34,
col. 2 (quoting the General Accounting Office, "Actual losses due to fraud and other illegal
archives will never be known because most go undetected"); Heymann, White-Collar Crime
Symposium Introduction, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 271, 272 (1980).
16 The Inspector General of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare con-
cluded that "best estimates" are the only available measures for Federal dollars lost to fraud,
abuse, and waste in the Department's programs. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
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that one to ten percent of federal funds in programs such as Medicaid,
food stamps, and Defense Department purchasing is lost through
fraud. 17 A 1980 inquiry conducted by the Republican Study Commit-
tee concluded that $34 billion in "waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanage-
ment" could be saved. 18 Other estimates of money lost through fraud
and waste range as high as $51 billion to $77 billion a year. 19
Most of these losses occur in one of three ways. "Program fraud"
involves fraud against the United States government in its direct provi-
sion of services and benefits to individuals, businesses, and other levels of
government.2 0 "Contract fraud" occurs when the government enters
into contracts with private industry for property, materials and serv-
ices.2 ' Finally, there is fraud by public officials, including receipt of
bribes and kickbacks.2 2 Developing a clear picture of the magnitude of
fraud and corruption requires an examination of each type of illicit
activity.
Since the New Deal, the federal government has administered a
vast array of social programs designed to provide benefits to citizens and
businesses. In part, the benefit programs exist to help the needy. Pro-
grams such as Medicaid and Medicare, food stamps, Aid to Families
with Dependent Children, and federal housing subsidies, reflect society's
commitment to assist those who, for whatever reason, are unable to take
WELFARE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL ANNUAL REPORT: APRIL 1, 1977-DECEMBER
31, 1977, 8 (1978).
17 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 9, at 9. Additionally, a Department of Justice
estimate puts the loss to taxpayers from violations of federal regulations by corporations at
$10 to $20 billion each year. LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, ILLEGAL
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 16 (1979).
18 Chicago Tribune, Jan. 18, 1981, at 10, col. 5.
19 Id. at 1, col. 2. In part, the tremendous variance in estimates of losses from fraud re-
flects the impossibility of precise measurement. In part, too, there is some difficulty in defin-
ing the terms "fraud and abuse." See LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION,
FRAUD AND ABUSE IN GOVERNMENT BENEFIT PROGRAMS 14-16 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
L.E.A.A., Fraud and Abuse]. For the purpose of this article fraud is defined by its traditional
common law meaning: "all acts, omissions and concealments which involve a breach of legal
or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by
which an undue advantage is taken of another." 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 187
(6th ed. 1853); see also Green v. Lombard, 28 Md. App. 1, 13, 343 A.2d 905, 913 (1975);
People v. Wilson, 205 Mich. 28, 33, 171 N.W. 474,478 (1919); Adamson v. Union Ry. Co., 26
N.Y.S. 136, 141 (1893); Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1978). Of course, this
article is concerned only with fraud against the government.
20 For example, it is estimated that in 1978, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (now the Department of Health and Human Services) alone lost $7.4 billion in tax-
payer funds through fraud, abuse, and waste in benefit programs. Fraud, Abuse, Waste, and
Mismanagement by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on GovernmentalAfairs, 95 Cong.., 2d Sess. 3 (1978).
21 A. BEQUAI, supra note 3, at 67-71.
22 Id. at 44-45.
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care of themselves.23 Anti-poverty programs have grown tremendously
over the last twenty years. Income transfer payments rose from 4.1 per-
cent to 10.7 percent of the Gross National Product between 1956 and
1978.24 One prominent example of this increase is in health expendi-
tures where federal spending rose from $7.4 billion to $68 billion be-
tween 1966 and 1979.25
Benefit programs, however, have not been limited to helping the
needy. Businesses, too, have been major recipients of federal largesse.
For example, the farm income stabilization program involves direct gov-
ernment payments to owners of farm land. The government provides
price supports and income in years of abundant supply to discourage
excess production, and funds the creation of grain reserves for use in
years of short supply.2 6 Federal money supports commodities including
cotton, tobacco, grain, peanuts and sorghum. Similarly, the Small Busi-
ness Administration oversees a variety of loan programs to aid business
growth and development.2 7
Each of these benefit programs is beset by fraud, committed both
by recipients and by third party providers. Recipients, those persons
who directly receive program benefits, commit fraud by misrepresenting
eligibility, falsifying data such as income, birth date, social security
identification, veteran status, and marital status.2 8 A well-publicized
case of a major fraud accomplished through false statements involved
the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT) and its re-
ceipt of $92 million in expropriation insurance from the Overseas Pri-
vate Investment Corporation (OPIC).29 After ITT's assets were
nationalized in Chile, ITT applied for compensation from OPIC. As a
condition to receipt of aid, ITT officials certified that the company had
no involvement in domestic politics in Chile.3 0 Pursuant to this certifi-
cation, ITT received government compensation. Subsequent Congres-
sional hearings revealed that ITT officials had perjured themselves and
that the company was not legally entitled to the money it received. 3 1
23 L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 155 (1980).
24 COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 268-269
(1979).
25 BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 8, at 242.
26 Id. at 170.
27 Id. at 182, 213.
28 L.E.A.A., FRAUD AND ABUSE, supra note 19, at 21 (1979). For example, the General
Accounting Office estimated that in 1977 the government lost $600 million in the food stamp
program alone. Chicago Sun Times, May 8, 1981, at 34.
29 A. SAMPSON, THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF ITT 261 (1974).
30 Szulc, ITT Under the Gun, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 6, 1977, at 20-2 1.
31 STAFF OF SELECT SENATE COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, REPORT
ON COVERT ACTION IN CHILE 1963-1973, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-13 (1975); see also Szulc,
supra note 30, at 18-22.
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Recipients also defraud programs by creating "ghost eligibles,"
fictitious persons who are awarded benefits. 32 A well-constructed plan
for creating "ghost eligibles" can cost the government millions of dollars.
For example, two individuals with vast landholdings in west Texas de-
vised a scheme which defrauded the federal government of more than
$4,500,000 through the creation of "ghost eligibles. ' 33 Under the Up-
land Cotton Program34 each individual owning or renting land was en-
titled to a maximum subsidy of $55,000.35 To circumvent this payment
limitation, bogus leases and fraudulent representations on government
forms were executed to create the appearance of having dozens of per-
sons eligible to receive payments, when in fact, only two were legally
entitled to receive subsidies.
Fraud in benefit programs also occurs through the actions of third
party providers.36 In many benefit programs, government agencies con-
tract with the private sector to deliver services to qualified recipients.3 7
For example, in the Medicare and Medicaid programs, pharmacies, hos-
pitals, nursing homes, and physicians are third party providers, supply-
ing medical services to eligible beneficiaries.3 8 Fraud by providers in
these health programs alone is significant.3 9 Numerous examples exist
of submission of false claims, delivery of unnecessary services, and delib-
32 L.E.A.A., FRAUD AND ABUSE, supra note 19, at 22.
33 United States v. Thomas, 593 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1974), modi, fd on rehearing, 604 F.2d
450 (5th Cir. 1979), afd 617 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1977). Civil actions were brought in United
States v. John H. Thomas, et al., Civil Action No. 5-78-75 (N.D. Tex., settled, 1980).
34 The Upland Cotton Program was created by Section 602 of the Agricultural Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-524, 84 Stat. 1375, 7 U.S.C. § 1444(e) (1970).
35 7 U.S.C. § 1307 (1970); 7 C.F.R. § 795.1 (1971).
36 See L.E.A.A., FRAUD AND ABUSE, supra note 19, at 23-30.
37 Id. at 23-24. For example, the Community Services Administration provides grants to
community groups to provide social services. Diversion of funds, embezzlement, and use of
federal money for fraudulent purposes is widespread in this program. Fraud andAbuse in Com-
munity Services Administration: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Covernmental Afairs, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 28-33 (1979).
38 L.E.A.A., FRAUD AND ABUSE, supra note 19, at 24. In 1981, it is estimated that Medi-
caid outlays of $15.9 billion will finance care of 23 million poor Americans. Medicare pro-
vides services to 25 million aged and 3 million disabled at a cost of $37.3 billion annually.
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 8, at 245. For a detailed discussion of fraud in
these programs, see Laudicina & Schneider, The ledicare-MedicaidAnti-Fraud andAbuse Amend-
ments of 1977 Implications for the Poor, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 843 (1978); Lee, Fraud and
Abuse in Medicare and Medicaid, 30 AD. L. REv. 1 (1978); Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and
Administrative Law: A Structural Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 243 (1978).
39 A. BEQUAI, supra note 3, at 70. Another example of fraud by third-party providers is
the actions of trade and proprietary schools which receive Federal money given to students to
pay tuition. Fraud, ranging from misuse of funds to embezzlement, is widespread. See Hear-
ings, Fraud, Abuse, Waste and Mismanagement of Programs by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, supra note 20, at 85-95.
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crate overbilling in the Medicare and Medicaid systems.40
A second major area of fraud is in government contracts. The gov-
ernment purchases billions of dollars worth of goods and services.41 In-
vestigations, audits, and prosecutions indicate that the procurement
process is regularly exploited for illegal profits. The government loses
billions of dollars each year through claims for payments for non-deliv-
ery of goods and services, intentional overcharging, and collusion among
contractors and suppliers to frustrate competitive bidding processes. 42 A
few examples illustrate the techniques and pervasiveness of contract
fraud.
Major grain companies intentionally defrauded the United States
Food for Peace Program by providing grain of a quality inferior to that
which they contracted to provide. 43 This practice, together with delib-
erate "short-weighting," supplying less than the amount paid for, and
rigging of bids, cost the government millions of dollars.44 More gener-
ally, cost overruns on government contracts are so prevalent that some
believe contractors intentionally inflate claims for millions of dollars.45
The indictment of Litton Industries, a major defense contractor, for
fraudulently overcharging the government by more than $37 million is
but one example.46
Bid-rigging is prevalent, but often never discovered. Competitive
bidding is designed to allow the government to obtain goods at the low-
est possible cost. 47 Companies, however, avoid the requirement for com-
petitive bidding through collusion and mutual agreements. For
example, millions of dollars in fraud were traced to contractors con-
structing the Byrd International Airport in Richmond, Virginia. Major
companies responsible for constructing the airport and a nearby road
40 A. BEQUAI, supra note 3, at 70; LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION,
FRAUD AND ABUSE AMONG MEDICAID PRACTITIONERS (1976).
41 A. BEQUAI, supra note 3, at 67.
42 L.E.A.A., THE INVESTIGATION OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME, supra note 11, at 17; A. BE-
QUAI, supra note 3, at 67. For example, procurement contracts by the General Services Ad-
ministration to obtain office furniture and supplies for the Federal government have been
beset by all of these types of fraud. See Continued Investigation Into Fraud and Mismanagement in the
General Services Administration." Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Afairs, 96th Cong.,
Ist Sess. parts 1-5 (1979).
43 See Grain Inspection, Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Foresty, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975).
44 MORGAN, MERCHANTS OF GRAIN (1977); Webster, An Examination of FBI Theo and
Methodolog Regarding White-Collar Crime Investigation and Prevention, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 275,
277 (1980).
45 A. BEQUAI, supra note 3, at 68.
46 Litton is indicted in $37 Million Overcharge Case, Washington Post, April 7, 1977, at A- 1.
47 Maltz & Pollock, Anayzing Suspected Collusion Among Bidders, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME
174-176 (Geis & Stotland eds. 1978).
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were convicted on bid-rigging charges.48
Yet another example of major contract fraud involves the Small
Business Administration's minority business program.4 9 Under this pro-
gram, businesses controlled by minorities are given preference in the
award of federal contracts. White-control led companies, however, es-
tablished shell firms, which they controlled to qualify as minority busi-
nesses. In this way, white-controlled "fronts" "have siphoned off
millions of dollars in SBA contracts by simply hiring blacks as executive
officers."5 0
Finally, fraud occurs in the form of corruption of public officials.
Bribes and kickbacks are not unusual. Companies pay bribes and kick-
backs to gain a competitive edge, to acquire or retain businesses or serv-
ices, and to coverup provision of inferior products.51 Bribes and
kickbacks are frequent in programs such as Medicaid, Unemployment
Insurance, Small Business Administration minority business programs,
the Summer Food Service, the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment's Rehabilitation Housing Program, the Department of Agri-
culture's Rural Housing Program, and the Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act programs.5 2 Public officials may be given bribes and
kickbacks in exchange for awarding government contracts.5 3
Furthermore, some public officials directly defraud federal pro-
grams. As the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration explains:
Employees usually commit crimes successfully because they know how
benefits are conveyed, and the timing and methods of delivery. Collusion
with clients to defraud, creation of fictitious clients and client records, and
creation of fictitious postal addresses to collect defrauded benefits are
crimes committed by some employees as a result of their inside knowledge
and their ability to use that knowledge.54
For example, eight employees in a Detroit welfare office were indicated
for fraudulently obtaining $143,000 in food stamps by falsifying 37
family files. 55
48 Chicago Tribune, Jan. 21, 1981, at 15, col. 3. See general4 Maltz & Pollock, supra note
47, at 147-98.
49 A. BEQUAI, supra note 3, at 68.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 41; J. JESTER, AN ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZED CRIME INFILTRATION OF LEGrrI-
MATE BUSINESS 24 (1976) ("[o]ne of the greatest sources of unfair competitive advantage is
the assistance of corrupt public officials in securing contracts and other favors").
52 L.E.A.A., FRAUD AND ABUSE, supra note 19, at 29.
53 A. BEQUAI, supra note 3, at 65.
54 L.E.A.A., FRAUD AND ABUSE, supra note 19, at 33-34. For example, one well-known
instance involved an accountant in the Department of Transportation's Urban Mass Transit
Administration who was charged in 1977 with embezzling $800,000. Legislative Branch Appro-
priations Fiscal Year 1981: Hearings before the Senate Subcomm. on Legislative Appropriations, Part 2,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 738 (1980) (testimony of Elmer Staats).
55 Chicago Tribune, Jan. 21, 1981, at 15, col. 1.
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Every dollar lost via fraud is one less dollar that can be spent con-
structively. The losses because of program fraud, contract fraud, and
bribery,56 must be met either by raising taxes to pay for higher costs or
decreasing availability of benefits. 5 7 Either way, both taxpayers and in-
tended recipients lose. Additionally, fraud in federal programs may "di-
minish public support for the programs" and ultimately "undermine
public trust and confidence in governmental institutions." 58
B. THE INADEQUACY OF GOVERNMENT CRIMINAL AND CIVIL
SANCTIONS
Given the magnitude of fraud and corruption, systematic imposi-
tion of criminal and civil sanctions is essential both to recoup lost
money59 and to deter others from committing fraud.60 The government
consistently "has placed heavy reliance on the criminal justice system as
its main line of defense in combating program fraud and abuse."'6 1 Nu-
merous federal laws make it a crime to defraud government programs.
The most important statute is the False Claims Act 62 which prohibits
the making of false, fraudulent, and fictitious claims against the federal
government. 63 The False Claims Act has been used to prosecute many
56 In instances of bribery it can be assumed that bribers inflated the cost of their contracts
with the government by at least the amount of the bribes. Continental Management, Inc. v.
United States, 527 F.2d 613, 619 (Ct. Cl. 1975) ("the amount of the bribe provides a reason-
able measure of damage. . . . that is, after all, the value the [bribers] placed on their corrup-
tion of the [government's] employees; the other side of the coin is that the [bribers] hoped and
expected to benefit by more than the sum of the bribes").
57 L.E.A.A., THE INVESTIGATION OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME, supra note 11, at 17; AGEN-
CIES CAN Do MORE, supra note 12, at 6.
58 Id.
59 L.E.A.A., FRAUD AND ABUSE, supra note 19, at 45.
60 Id. For a general discussion of the importance of deterrence as a means for achieving
compliance with the law, see J. BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAw, Pt. II, Bk. 1, ch. 3 in
Bentham's work 396, 402 (Bowring ed. 1843); B. WooTTON, CRIME AND CRIMINAL LAW 97-
103 (1963); Andenaes, The General Preventive Ejfects ofPunishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 954-
56, 960-70 (1966). It should be noted that the concept of deterrence and its morality have
been challenged. See, e.g., H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 337-
38 (2d ed. 1951); Gardiner, The Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 21 MOD. L. REV. 117, 122-25
(1958). Nonetheless, "[a]cademicians, all levels of the judiciary, enforcement officials, and
Congress have accepted the idea that the use of the criminal penalty is a legitimate means of
checking an offense not yet committed, by associating with it a deterrent threat." Comment,
Criminal Sanctionsfor Corporate Illegality, 69 J. CRIM. L. & C. 40, 45 (1978).
61 L.E.A.A., FRAUD AND ABUSE, supra note 19, at 89.
62 Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696. The criminal proscription against making
false claims is found in 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1976). The civil remedies against false claims are
found at 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976). Also, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) forbids the making of "false
statements to any department or agency of the United States." For an in-depth analysis of
this statute, see Note, The Federal False Claims Act:. A Remedial Alternative for Protecting the Govern-
mentfrom Fraudulent Practices, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 159 (1978).
63 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1976).
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different types of program abuse,64 including Medicaid, Medicare, and
Social Security fraud;65 claims for services not actually provided to the
government; 66 and contract fraud through collusive bidding.67 Addi-
tionally, many statutes creating federal programs contain separate pro-
visions specifically tailored to prevent fraud. For example, in 1977,
Congress passed the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amend-
ments, making fraud in those programs a felony, with penalties not to
exceed a $25,000 fine or five years imprisonment or both.68
While criminal sanctions are one weapon, they are not by them-
selves sufficient to control fraud and corruption. Experts, almost with-
out exception, agree that:
there is virtually no evidence that the criminal sanction has succeeded in
controlling white collar crime. In general, deterrence has not been real-
ized, rehabilitation has been ignored, repeat offenders have not been re-
moved from society, and victims have not been compensated. In large
measure, these results are a product of the natural limits of the criminal
justice system.69
Government sanctions, both civil and criminal, are inherently inade-
quate for three major reasons.
First, institutional limits, the inevitable shortage of investigative
and prosecutorial resources, insure the inadequacy of government en-
forcement efforts. 70 Fraud cases are significantly more complex and
time consuming to develop than are more common crimes. 71 In fact, as
a rule, the larger the magnitude of the fraud, the more complex and
intricate the investigation is likely to be.72 For example, prosecution of
third-party providers for fraud usually requires a lengthy trial with hun-
dreds of exhibits and witnesses. 73
Because the prosecution of these-cases "entails an enormous expen-
diture of. . .resources in relation to the number of cases prosecuted
64 See White-Collar Cime: A Survq ofthe Law, 18 AM. GRIM. L. REv. 169, 281 (1980).
65 See, e.g., United States v. Precision Medical Laboratories, 593 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Beasly, 550 F.2d 261 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977); United States
v. Catena, 500 F.2d 1319 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1047 (1974).
66 See, e.g., United States v. Young, 575 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Buigues, 568 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1978).
67 See, e.g., United States v. Hedgeman, 564 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070
(1977); United States v. Cripps, 460 F. Supp. 969 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
68 Pub. L. No. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1179 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(b)(2), 139bh(b)(1) (Supp. III
1979).
69 Ogren, The Ineffectiveness of the Criminal Sanction in Fraud and Corruption Cases: Losing the
Battle Against White-Collar Crime, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 959, 960 (1973).
70 A. BEQUAI, supra note 3, at 150.
71 L.E.A.A., THE INVESTIGATION OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME, supra note 11, at 2.
72 Id.
73 L.E.A.A., FRAUD AND ABUSE, supra note 19, at 100.
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. . . comparatively few" are pursued.7 4 Ultimately, even if resources al-
located to enforcement efforts were increased, government prosecutors
still would be able to deal with only a small fraction of current fraud
and corruption. 75 Charles Ruff, former Watergate Special Prosecutor
and Assistant Deputy Attorney General, explains:
I think it is clear that we have to recognize, and this is something which I
think was not recognized in earlier years, that criminal prosecution simply
cannot be the answer to this problem. We cannot deal with anything
much more than a very small percentage of the loss that occurs through
fraud, abuse and waste, by criminal prosecutions, nor do we realistically
have the resources to detect, through law enforcement personnel, those
losses.7 6
Similarly, resource limitations restrict government civil suits to a
small percentage of the fraud. The total dollar amount of pending civil
suits filed by the Justice Department as of March, 1978 was only $250
million. 77 Even Justice Department officials concede that this "is only a
fraction of the amount defrauded the government. '78
The low level of government enforcement efforts insures not only
that recovery of the sums lost through fraud will remain a small percent-
age, but also that deterrence will be minimal. Deterrence depends in
large measure on the likelihood of punishment being imposed. 79 To the
extent that limited resources mean that relatively few cases of fraud will
be prosecuted, there is little to deter perpetrators of fraud.80
Second, even in those cases prosecutors pursue, the sanctions im-
posed are so minimal as to provide little deterrent effect. 8 I Tradition-
ally, penalties for white-collar crime, including fraud, have been small.8 2
Jail sentences are rarely imposed.8 3 For example, one study examined
sentencing practices by judges in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia in fraud and corruption cases over a three year
74 Ogren, supra note 69, at 960. In fact, the Reagan administration has announced a
policy of shifting resources away from enforcement against fraud and white-collar crime.
New York Times, Jan. 16, 1981, § 2 at 5, col. 6.
75 A. BEQUAI, supra note 3, at 150; Ogren, supra note 69, at 973.
76 Fraud in Government. Hearings before the House of Representatives Task Force on Govenment
Eftieny of the Committee on the Budget, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979) (testimony of Charles
Ruff).
77 AGENCIES CAN Do MORE, supra note 14, at ii.
78 Id.
79 See A. DERSHOwITz, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 3 (1976); N. MORRIS & G.
HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIANS GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL 255-61 (1970); F. ZIMR-
ING, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 1-2 (1971).
80 L.E.A.A., FRAUD AND ABUSE, supra note 19, at 81, 99-101; Ogren, supra note 69, at 960.
81 Ogren, supra note 69, at 959-60.
82 L.E.A.A., ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR, supra note 17, at 207-12.
83 See, e.g., W. SEYMOUR, WHY JUSTICE FAILS 45-46 (1973); L.E.A.A., ILLEGAL CORPO-
RATE BEHAVIOR, supra note 17, at 208.
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period.84 In only 24 percent of the cases was a prison term with a maxi-
mum jail time of three years imposed. Moreover, in a quarter of these
cases, the judge reduced the sentence.85 In another study of 56 federally
convicted executives, 62.5 percent received probation, 21.4 percent had
their sentences suspended, and only 28.6 percent were incarcerated. 86
The average prison sentence for all those convicted in this study was 2.8
days.8 7 Similarly, out of 40,000 cases of fraud uncovered by investiga-
tors in the Medicare program, only 220 resulted in successful prosecu-
tion, and only 37 offenders were sentenced to prison terms.88
Thus, the widely held conception that white-collar criminals rarely
experience jail sentences or meaningful criminal sanctions is quite accu-
rate.89 It is highly doubtful that this pattern will change. In part, the
lax approach to white-collar crime exists because perpetrators of major
frauds are "usually community leaders with excellent educational back-
grounds and high social status."90 As such, from a sociological perspec-
tive, light sentences are easily explainable:
One reason for lenient treatment is the high degree of cultural homogene-
ity among the defendants, the legislators who pass the laws regulating busi-
nessmen, and the judges who determine guilt and mete out sentences to
violators of those laws. Because businessmen, lawmakers and judges come
from similar social backgrounds, are of similar age, have often been edu-
cated at the same universities, associate with the same people, and have
similar outlooks on the world, it is not surprising that legislators and judges
are unwilling to treat business offenders harshly.91
Similarly, juries are likely to sympathize with white-collar defendants.92
Furthermore, because much fraud is committed by corporations, it
is often difficult to identify which individuals within the business are
culpable.93 Most often in fraud cases, individuals accused and indicted
plead nolo contendere and then receive mild sentences.94 Together,
these factors create a system where probation and short prison sentences
84 Ogren, supra note 69, at 962.
85 Id. Furthermore, even when jail sentences were imposed, defendants never had to serve
more than one-third of their sentences before being eligible for parole. Id.
86 L.E.A.A., ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR, supra note 17, at 209.
87 Id.
88 A. BEQUAI, supra note 3, at 70. One prominent case involved two physicians found
guilty of submitting false claims in the Medicaid program. These doctors could have been
sentenced to 205 years in prison for the offenses involved. They were given suspended
sentences. Id. at 71.
89 See Ogren, supra note 69, at 959.
90 L.E.A.A., ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR, supra note 17, at 207.
91 J.E. CONKLIN, "ILLEGAL BuT NOT CRIMINAL": BusINEss CRIMES IN AMERICA 112
(1977).
92 Comment, supra note 60, at 49.
93 L.E.A.A., ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR, supra note 17, at 206-07.
94 J.E. CONKLIN, supra note 91, at 119; L.E.A.A., ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR, supra
note 17, at 208.
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are common in cases of fraud and corruption. 95
Nor are substantial fines imposed in fraud cases. In most instances,
the profit received from the illegality is greater than the fine to be
paid.96 A corporation usually gains "more financially from its crimes
than it pays in a fine if convicted. ' 97 And criminal sanctions do not
require that the defendant repay the amount fraudulently gained.98
Ultimately, the small penalties imposed in fraud cases insure mini-
mal deterrence of corruption. 99 Though there are serious problems in
attempting to measure the precise deterrent effect of various levels of
punishment, 0 0 there is widespread agreement that substantial penalties
are necessary to deter fraud. 10 1 The improbability of ever being prose-
cuted for fraud, combined with the likelihood of a small sentence, pro-
duces a situation where there is little to deter perpetrators.10 2
Finally, political pressure and corruption of public officials charged
with enforcement often means that the government chooses not to bring
suit or seek the imposition of criminal or civil actions. Political consider-
ations may directly influence whether prosecutions are undertaken and
if they are, who is indicted. 0 3 As one expert notes:
white-collar criminals have access to large sums of money and can influ-
ence powerful political officials . . .Federal prosecutors are no exception.
They sustain the political process that produced them. Since the end of
World War II, the majority of those who held the office of U. S. Attorney
General were political figures who played key roles in the election of the
President. 10 4
Especially where high level government officials are implicated, the con-
centration of all enforcement machinery in the hands of the government
may mean that no prosecutorial action will be taken.
None of the above analysis is meant to suggest that criminal and
civil prosecution by the government is undesirable or that it should not
be pursued. Rather, the point is that government action by itself is not
sufficient to control fraud. Resource limitations, minimal sanctions, and
political pressure, insure that only a fraction of fraud cases ever will be
95 Ogren, supra note 69, at 962-63.
96 Ogren, supra note 69, at 968; Comment, supra note 60, at 48.
97 J.E. CONKLIN, supra note 91, at 103.
98 Ogren, supra note 69, at 980-81.
99 Id. at 962.
too See general/y A. BLUMSTEIN, J. COHEN, & D. NAGIN, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITA-
TION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (1978).
101 See K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 403-04 (1962); Geis, Deterring Corporate C rme, in
CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 182 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1972); Ogren, supra note
69, at 960.
102 L.E.A.A., FRAUD AND ABUSE, supra note 19, at 100-01; Comment, supra note 60, at 46.
103 L.E.A.A., ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR, supra note 17, at 9.
104 A. BEQUAI, supra note 3, at 147.
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prosecuted and hence that deterrence is unlikely. Simply put, given the
magnitude of fraud and corruption and the inadequacy of criminal
sanctions, additional remedies are essential.
C. ADDING A NEW WEAPON TO THE ARSENAL: THE TAXPAYER CLASS
ACTION
One way to increase both the number of lawsuits against fraud and
the size of the penalty is to permit individual taxpayers to sue to recover
money for the government. In cases involving substantial government
losses,' 05 citizens would be able to bring civil suit on behalf of the
United States."' 6 The person bringing suit, if successful, would receive a
fraction of the amount recovered, with the majority of the funds re-
turned to the Treasury.10 7
Such a remedy would not substitute for government enforcement
efforts, but rather would supplement them. A taxpayer's suit would
''not prevent the bringing of either a criminal action by the government
• . .or, where appropriate, an ordinary action in tort."'0 8 The tax-
payer's class action would be "an ancillary remedy, designed to add to,
rather than substitute for more conventional law enforcement
methods." 0 9
Authority for such suits is premised on the belief that public money
or property ultimately belongs to the taxpayers and is held in trust for
them by the government." 0 Thus, taxpayers have a legitimate interest
105 The statute creating authority for the taxpayer's suit would set a minimum dollar
amount as a precondition for federal court jurisdiction. For example, by only allowing suits
for more than $50,000 it can be insured that taxpayers' suits will focus only on major frauds.
See Section 3(b) of the proposed statute infra.
106 "The taxpayer does not assert a private cause of action but, instead, that of his govern-
ment. Therefore, a taxpayers' suit is essentially a 'derivative proceeding akin to a corporate
shareholders' suit." Note, Taxpayers Actions: Public Invocation of theJudicia, 13 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 397, 398 (1977). Throughout this article the terms "citizen's suits" and "taxpayer's
suits" are used interchangeably because it is expected that most citizens pay some federal
taxes. The statute itself should limit plaintiffs to federal taxpayers because they can allege a
monetary injury, more easily meeting the standing requirement for injury in fact. See discus-
sion at pp. 1516-18 in/a.
107 The amount recovered would include the sum gained by fraud together with any pen-
alties (e.g.. double damages) or forfeitures provided for in the statute. See discussion accompa-
nying notes 236-40 in/ra.
108 Comment, Qui Tam Actions: The Role of the Private Citizen in Law Enforcement, 20 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 778, 795 (1973).
109 Id.
110 74 AM. JUR. 2d, Tapayers'Actions § 26 at 233 (1974) ("public money or property be-
longs to the taxpayers and is simply held in trust by public officers for the benefit of the
taxpayers, and consequently such taxpayers have an interest in protecting the same in case
the trustees neglect or fail to do so.") Se, e.g., Lord v. City of Wilmington, 332 A.2d 414,418-
19 (1975); People ex rel. Hamer v. Board of Education, 22 Ill. App. 3d 130, 133, 316 N.E.2d
820, 823 (1974); Chippawa Bridge Co. v. Durand, 122 Wis. 85, 99 N.W. 603, 611 (1904).
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in bringing suit to recover money lost by fraud if the government fails to
do so. 1' Taxpayer suits would increase the resources available for in-
vestigating and prosecuting fraud." 2 Citizens would become "private
attorneys general,"' 1 3 with a monetary incentive to initiate litigation in
instances where the government fails to act.' 14
The concept of allowing citizens' suits as a vehicle for the govern-
ment to recover money is not new. In fact, in the fourteenth century,
England enacted statutes allowing private individuals to initiate litiga-
tion on behalf of the Crown. 115 Such citizen suits were called "qui tam"
actions. 16 A qui tam suit is:
an action brought by a private litigant pursuant to a statute which estab-
lishes a penalty, fine or forfeiture for a proscribed act and permits the qui
tam plaintiff to recover a portion of the penalty. The private litigant,
without prior approval of the government, brings suit on behalf of the gov-
ernment, as well as himself.
1 17
Qui tam actions were initially designed "to supplement England's insuffi-
cient legal machinery in order to bring more offenses to the cognizance
of the courts."" 8 The private citizen, "stimulated by his share of the
penalty, was expected to play a considerable part" in enforcing En-
gland's laws.' 19
111 See, e.g., Bernstein v. Krom, 111 N.J. Super. 559, 270 A.2d 51 (1970); Stetler v. MeFar-
lane 230 N.Y. 400, 130 N.E. 591 (1921); Faden v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 424 Pa.
273, 227 A.2d 619 (1967).
112 As one commentator expressed, citizen suits are desirable "where more effective law
enforcement is desired, either because the crime involved is serious enough to require extra
attention or because existing remedies are for some reason inadequate." Comment, supra note
108, at 795. As the earlier discussion demonstrated, fraud and corruption are serious crimes
where prosecutorial resources are inadequate.
113 The phrase "private attorneys general" seems to have been first used in Associated
Industries, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d. Cir. 1943).
114 "Taxpayers litigation seems designed to enable a large body of citizenry to challenge
governmental action which would otherwise go unchallenged. Note, Tapayers'Suit. A
Sury and Summaiy, 69 YALE L. J. 895, 904 (1960).
115 Note, The Qui Tam Doctrine:. A Comparative Analsis of Its Application in the United States and
the British Commonwealth, 7 TEx. INT'L L. J. 415, 418 (1972).
116 The term "qui tam" comes from the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege quam quo
se imposo sequitur," meaning "Who brings the action as well for the king as for himself."
Bass Anglers Sportsmen's Soc'y of America v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Paper's, Inc., 324 F.
Supp. 302, 305 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
117 Note, supra note 4, at 449-50. See also United States ex rel. Varce v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 (W.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Florida Vanderbilt
Developments Corp., 326 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 517
P.2d 911 (1974).
118 Note, supra note 115, at 417.
119 2 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 5, at 146. "Under [qui tam] statutes, financial incentives
were provided, the purpose of which was to create and keep active a vast number of 'volun-
tary policemen', who were to be paid on the results achieved by their own zeal and enter-
prise. . . . It was hoped that they would be of great assistance in the administration of
criminal justice, solely because of the spur provided by the offer of reward." Id. at 145-46.
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Qui tam actions existed for hundreds of years in England until they
were abolished by an act of Parliament in 1951.120 In part, such suits
were eliminated because law enforcement efforts became increasingly ef-
fective,' 2' and in part, because of their abuse.' 22 Nonetheless, the con-
cept of citizen suits remains firmly ingrained in British and American
jurisprudence. Many states have laws permitting qui tam actions 23 and
a number of federal statutes explicitly allow for enforcement by private
citizens. ' 24
The concept of the qui tam action is especially well-suited to dealing
with fraud and corruption. As explained above, the "two primary rea-
sons for permitting qui tam actions-insufficient police personnel and
government inaction-exist today."' 25 Allowing successful plaintiffs to
receive a portion of the money recovered through their efforts creates an
incentive for private citizens to investigate fraud. Such non-governmen-
tal investigations are most likely to be successful in cases of "consensual
crimes."126 For example, bribery involves two willing parties, both of
whom consent to participate in the crime.' 27 Because there is no victim
directly injured by the criminal act, no complaint is filed and police
detection is obviously difficult. Often, however, private citizens may be
aware of the scheme and lack any incentive to come forward with their
information. Allowing citizen suits provides a strong incentive for indi-
viduals to act on their knowledge. In fact, it is for this reason that qui
tam actions frequently have been called "informers' suits."'128 As one
Senator, advocating authority for qui tam suits, expressed over one hun-
dred years ago: "the old fashioned idea of holding out a temptation,
and 'setting a rogue to catch a rogue'. . . is the safest and most expedi-
120 Common Informers Act, 14 & 15 Geo. 6 ch. 39 (1951).
121 Comment, supra note 108, at 779.
122 Id. It has been suggested that most of the abuse of qui tam actions resulted from their
application to inappropriate statutes, "rather than from a basic fault with the action itself."
Note, supra note 115, at 419.
123 Examples of state statutes authorizing citizen-taxpayer suits include: CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 526(a) (West 1979); 19 GA. CODE ANN. § 64-104 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-17-3
(Bums 1973); NEBR. REV. STAT. § 19-2907 (1977); N.Y. STATE FIN. § 123 (McKinney Supp.
1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 128-10 (1981).
124 See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. III 1979); Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976); Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411, 413 (1976).
For a discussion of qui tam actions under the Refuse Act of 1899, see Kafin & Needlemar, The
Use of Qui Tam Actions to Protect the Environment, 17 N.Y.L.F. 130 (1971); Note, Qui Tam Actions
and the Rivers and Harbors Act, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 173 (1971); Note, Qui Tam Actions for
Citizen Enforcement of the Refuse Act of 1899 Against Polluters, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 182 (1972).
125 Note, supra note 4, at 451 n.23.
126 Comment, supra note 108, at 801.
127 Note, supra note 4, at 451-52 n.23.
128 Note, supra note 4, at 449 n.16.
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tious way I have discovered of bringing rogues to justice. ' ' 129
Furthermore, authority for citizen suits will not only increase the
investigation of fraud, but its prosecution as well. Prosecutors have in-
herently limited resources and can act only on a small fraction of the
cases involving governmental corruption. 130 Taxpayers can supplement
government prosecutions by bringing civil suits in cases where otherwise
no action would be taken. Moreover, "the availability of such litigation
is insurance against the instances in which the responsible prosecutors,
usually political officers, are themselves allied with the action chal-
lenged .... ,,13i Especially in situations involving corruption of public
officials, the "need for taxpayers' suits arises from the absence of alterna-
tive means of correcting illegal practices of government officials which
would otherwise be irreparable."' 132
Additionally, in many cases, citizen suits would increase the penal-
ties imposed by providing for recovery of the illicitly gained sums. At
the very least, this would return funds to the program and provide
greater benefits for recipients. 133 By recovering the full amount de-
frauded, and perhaps double or treble damages, the profitability of graft
is significantly reduced.
In theory, the increased investigation, prosecution, and penalties
should lead to greater deterrence of future fraud and corruption.
Though it is impossible to estimate how much fraud would be deterred,
a higher level of certainty that prosecution will occur and that larger
penalties imposed should translate into less crime.134 Thus, citizen suits
would "serve to deter future unlawful acts. . . as well as to redress past
transgressions."1 35
Though such civil suits would in no way substitute for criminal
prosecutions, it should be recognized that civil litigation has many ad-
vantages over criminal actions. 3 6 Civil litigation is initiated with a
complaint, which can be amended. Criminal proceedings begin with, an
indictment which must be founded on probable cause and cannot be
129 Id. at 450 n.16 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 956 (1863)).
130 A. BEQUAI, supra note 3, at 150; see also discussion accompanying notes 70-80 supra.
131 Note, supra note 114, at 911.
132 Id. at 910.
133 81a C.J.S. States § 265 (1976) ("The purpose of statutes providing for a taxpayer's suit
to recover funds improperly paid out by state officials . . . is to encourage the recovery of
money illegally expended. .. 2).
134 See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CON-
TROL 90-141 (1973).
135 Note, supra note 106, at 399 n. 16.
136 See generaly Kovel, A Case for Civil Penalties: Air Pollution Control, 46 J. URB. L. 153, 156-
58 (1968).
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amended. 137 If a criminal defendant fails to appear, proceedings must
be delayed until the defendant's presence can be secured. If a civil de-
fendant is not present, a default judgment is entered, decreasing de-
lay.' 38 In criminal proceedings, proof of guilt must be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. Civil actions only require proof of liability
to be established by a preponderance of the evidence. In criminal trials,
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination allows a de-
fendant to refuse to testify and prevents any adverse inference to be
drawn from the defendant's silence. By contrast, in civil proceedings,
the fifth amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against a party
who refuses to testify in response to probative evidence offered against
him.139 In criminal cases, the government may not appeal a verdict for
the defendant. In civil actions, on the other hand, either party may
appeal if it loses in the trial court.' 4°
Perhaps the most important advantage of civil proceedings in cases
involving fraud is the broader scope of civil discovery. In civil cases, a
party "may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter in the pending action."'1 4' The
benefits of the expansive civil discovery provisions extend "beyond the
particular defendant since it can be used to obtain information about
the entire operation in which the defendant was involved, including the
methods employed and the identities of other participants." 42 Discov-
ery can greatly aid the investigation and detection of fraud, providing
private litigants with a powerful tool for uncovering corruption.
The experience of states which allow taxpayer suits indicates that
taxpayer actions could become a major weapon in the arsenal against
fraud and corruption. Citizens have brought many successful suits to
recover money for the government which otherwise would have been
lost. 143 Likewise, the experience in foreign countries such as Australia
137 NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, THE USE OF CIVIL REMEDIES IN ORGANIZED
CRIME CONTROL 3 (rev. ed. 1977).
138 Comment, supra note 60, at 43; NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 137,
at 4 ("[a] civil action may be both faster and less costly [than a criminal prosecution]").
139 NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 137, at 3.
140 Comment, supra note 60, at 43 n.28.
141 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
142 NAT'L ASs'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 137, at 8.
143 See, e.g., McMillen v. Agnew, Equity No. 23, 638 (Cir. Ct. Md. 1981) (taxpayer suit to
recover kickbacks received by Spiro Agnew while Governor of Maryland); Munson v. Abbott,
602 S.W.2d 649 (Ark. 1980) (taxpayer suit to obtain restitution of improperly spent public
funds); Nelson v. Berry Petroleum Co., 242 Ark. 273, 413 S.W.2d 46 (1967) (taxpayer suit to
recover more than $3 million the State lost as a result of a fraudulent scheme to fix prices for
asphalt used in constructing State highways); Richardson v. Blackburn, 41 Del. 54, 187 A.2d
823 (1963) (taxpayer suit to recover funds illegally paid to employees of Delaware's Youth
Service Committee); Wertz v. Shane, 216 Iowa 768, 249 N.W. 661 (1933) (taxpayer suit to
recover money illegally received by state legislators).
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and Canada indicates that taxpayer suits can be effectively used against
fraud.14 4 Given the magnitude of graft and corruption, and the inade-
quacy of governmental civil and criminal sanctions, authority for tax-
payer suits would be of tremendous benefit.
II. THE BARRIERS To TAXPAYER CLASS ACTIONS AGAINST FRAUD
AND CORRUPTION
Despite the desirability of citizen suits against fraud and corrup-
tion, such litigation is not currently allowed in federal courts. The law
of standing bars taxpayer suits in non-constitutional cases unless they
are explicitly authorized by statute. Unfortunately, the only statute
which could be used as a vehicle for these actions has been interpreted
so as to totally preclude taxpayer initiated proceedings.
A. STANDING BARRIERS TO TAXPAYER CLASS ACTIONS
1. The Concept of Standing
Article III of the United States Constitution restricts the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts to "cases and controversies." 1 45 This constitu-
tional mandate has been interpreted to require that a party seeking to
invoke a federal court's jurisdiction must allege "a personal stake in the
outcome of a controversy." '1 46 The question of whether a particular
plaintiff has a sufficient stake in the outcome of the controversy is
termed standing. Standing is the determination "of whether a person is
the proper party to present a particular issue to the court for
adjudication." 147
The requirement that a plaintiff have a personal stake in the out-
come of a controversy before he or she can ask the court to act is deeply
embedded in the traditional notion of the powers and duties of the
court. In Marbuy v. Madison,148 Justice Marshall stated that although
the courts are the final arbiters of the Constitution, their power to act is
triggered only by an obligation to decide disputes properly before them.
The Supreme Court concluded that the "province of the court is solely
to decide on the rights of individuals."' 149 Under this model, the court
144 See Note, supra note 115, at 422-24.
145 U.S. CONST. art. III § 2. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKEN, D. SHAPIRO & H.
WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 64-
241 (2d ed. 1973); Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Adrie IL Perspectives on the "Case or Contro-
ver.y" Requirements, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979).
146 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
147 Homburger, Pivate Suits in the Public Interest of the United States of America, 23 BUFFALO L.
REV. 343, 388 (1976).
148 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
149 Id. at 177.
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has an important function as lawmaker, but may only exercise that
function when two individuals "butting heads" over a particular disa-
greement bring their dispute to a judge. 150
Though many critics have suggested that nothing in the Constitu-
tion requires that each plaintiff be an individual who will gain or lose
depending on the outcome of the case, 151 for two hundred years courts
never have waivered on their requirement that the judicial power only
may be invoked by parties with standing. 52 The standing doctrine has
been justified by two policy considerations: the functioning of the courts
and separation of powers.
Since courts cannot conduct investigations or actively collect infor-
mation,153 they must rely upon the parties to present sufficient evidence
to delineate the issues.154 A party with a stake in the outcome of the
controversy presumably has had the greatest incentive to gather rele-
vant evidence and marshal available arguments. As one renowned legal
commentator observed almost a half century ago:
[C]ourts are more apt to formulate or apply rules soundly if the opposite
sides are prevented from sitting around a table together in friendly confer-
ence .... Bitter partisanship in opposite directions is supposed to bring
out the truth.' 55
Thus, courts have held that Article III requires that a plaintiff al-
lege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to as-
sure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions." 156 Courts are unwilling to trust plaintiffs su-
ing solely for ideological reasons to adequately prepare and present the
issues. 157 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that a "mere ab-
stract concern about a problem of general interest" does not provide
"that 'essential dimension of specificity' that informs judicial decision-
making."' 158 Furthermore, standing requirements also are believed to
150 See, Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE LJ. 1363, 1365
(1973).
151 See, e.g., Berger, Standing to Sue in PublicActions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE
L.J. 816 (1969).
152 Cf. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792) (federal court jurisdiction limited to
"cases and controversies"); Jaffe, The Citizen as a Litigant in Private Actions: The Non-Hohfeldran
or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968).
153 Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 n.10 (1974).
154 Id. at 221.
155 Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New Deal, 47 HARv. L. REv. 913, 922 (1934).
156 Baker v. Carr, 386 U.S. at 204.
157 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 425 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); See also Jaffe, supira note
152, at 1037.
158 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 263 (1977) (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. at
221).
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improve the functioning of the courts by reducing the judiciary's
caseload. Courts long have declared that without limiting litigation
through a narrow standing doctrine, class suits would flood the courts'
dockets.- 59
Additionally, the Supreme Court has explained the standing re-
quirement as one "founded in concern about the proper-and properly
limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."' 60 This reasoning
defines the limits of judicial power in part as the differences between
legislative and judicial functions. As an elected body, the legislature has
the general consent of the voters to pass laws. In contrast, the courts'
power is not obtained democratically.1 61 Therefore, the courts have
concluded that laws of broad applicability should be made by Congress,
and that the courts only should decide specific concrete issues affecting
the parties before them.162 The broader the issues addressed by a court
and the broader the class of persons affected, the more a court action
resembles the legislature's function. Actions brought on behalf of the
public are thought to "strain the judicial function and press to the limit
judicial authority.' 63 Thus, the Supreme Court has declared that:
[s]hould the courts seek to expand their power so as to bring under their
jurisdiction ill-defined controversies over constitutional issues, they would
become the organ of political theories. Such abuse ofjudicial power would
properly meet rebuke and restriction from other branches.164
2. Restictions on Taxpayer Standing
The Supreme Court has held that the "cases and controversies" re-
quirement of Article III requires a plaintiff to demonstrate " 'a distinct
and palpable injury to himself that is likely to be redressed if the re-
quested relief is granted."1 65 Furthermore, the policy considerations de-
159 See, e.g., Roosevelt v. Draper, 23 N.Y. 318 (1861); Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome
County, 18 N.Y. 155 (1858).
160 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
161 See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
162 Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. at 221 n. 10; Brilmayer,
supra note 145, at 303. The premise of this argument, that judicial review is counter-
majoritarian and therefore should be restricted, has been attacked by many commentators.
See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iii-v., 9-14 (1978); Brilmayer, supra
note 145, at 304.
163 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 130.
164 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90-91 (1947).
165 Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979). Thus, there are
two constitutional standing requirements: "injury in fact" (see United States v. SCRAP, 412
U.S. 669, 686 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972); Davis, Standing: Tax-
payers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 613 (1973)) and "redressability"-that a favorable
court decision will redress the injury suffered (see Duke Power Co. v. Caroline Environmental
States Group, Inc. 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organ-
ization, 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 500).
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scribed above have led the Court to adopt additional prudential, non-
constitutional, standing barriers. That is, even where a plaintiff's case is
constitutionally justiciable,
a plaintiff may still lack standing under the prudential principles by which
the judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social import
where no individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the
federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim. For
example, a litigant normally must assert an injury that is peculiar to him-
self or to a distinct group of which he is a part, rather than one 'shared in
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens.'1 66
The primary difference between the prudential bar against plaintiffs as-
serting generalized grievances and the constitutional standing require-
ments, is that Congress, by legislation, may expand standing to
overcome the prudential barrier but may not abrogate the constitu-
tional requirements. 167
Taxpayer standing is precluded by the prudential rule forbidding
the assertion of a grievance "shared in substantially equal measure by
all or a large class of citizens." The Court first announced this barrier to
taxpayer and citizen standing in Frothingham v. Mellon, 68 decided almost
sixty years ago. In Frothingham, the plaintiff, suing as a taxpayer, sought
to restrain expenditures under the federal Maternity Act of 1921, which
provided financial grants to the states to reduce maternal and infant
mortality. The plaintiff, Ms. Frothingham, asserted that the expendi-
tures violated the Tenth Amendment's reservation of powers to the
states. The Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff lacked standing be-
cause her "interest in the moneys of the Treasury. . . is comparatively
minute and indeterminable." 69 The Court held that federal court re-
view must be based on a plaintiff's alleging a direct injury and "not
merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people
generally."' 170
Similarly, a few years later in Ex Parte Levitt,17 1 the Supreme Court
ruled that citizenship is not in itself a source of standing. Levitt involved
a citizen's suit to have Justice Hugo Black's appointment to the
Supreme Court invalidated on the grounds that Justice Black had
voted, while a Senator, to increase Supreme Court justices' retirement
benefits. This was alleged to violate Article I, § 6 of the Constitution,
166 Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 99-100 (quoting Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. at 499).
167 Id.
168 262 U.S. 447 (1923). In a companion case, Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923), the Supreme Court denied the State of Massachusetts standing to attack the constitu-
tionality of the Maternity Act. Id. at 480, 482.
169 Id. at 487.
170 Id. at 488.
171 302 U.S. 633 (1937).
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which states that "No Senator ... shall during the time for which he
was elected, be appointed to any civil office the emoluments whereof
shall have increased during such time." The Court, however, held that
the plaintiff lacked standing because he did not assert a direct injury
and "it is not sufficient [for standing] that he has merely a general inter-
est common to all members of the public. '1 72
Fro/hingham and Levitt establish the prudential bar to taxpayer and
citizen standing. With only one notable exception, this rule has been
applied repeatedly and continues in force today. The exception in
which taxpayer standing was permitted is Flast v. Cohen. 173 In Flast, the
Court upheld a taxpayer's standing to challenge federal subsidies to pa-
rochial schools as violating the clause of the first amendment forbidding
the establishment of religion. Both the majority and the dissent in Flast
agreed that the rule preventing plaintiffs from asserting generalized
grievances was prudential rather than constitutional in origin. 174 The
majority concluded that this prudential bar should not apply in cases
where the taxpayer establishes both "a logical link between [the status
asserted] and the type of legislative enactment attacked" and a "nexus
between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringe-
ment alleged. ' 175 In Flast, the Court concluded that the Establishment
Clause of the first amendment created a specific limitation on the taking
and spending power, thereby creating a sufficient "nexus" to justify tax-
payer standing. 176
Predictions that Flas/ would open the door widely to taxpayer
standing in federal court were premature.1 77 In two 1974 decisions,
Uni/ed States v. Richardson 178 and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War,179 the Supreme Court clearly restated the bar against taxpayer
and citizen standing. In Richardson, the plaintiff suing as a federal tax-
payer, contended that the statutes providing for the secrecy of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency budget were unconstitutional. The plaintiff
argued that such secret expenditures violated the Constitution's require-
ment that "a regular statement and account of the receipt and expendi-
ture of all public money shall be published from time to time."' 180 The
Court held that the plaintiff was "seeking 'to employ a federal court as a
forum in which to air his generalized grievences about the conduct of
172 Id. at 634.
173 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
174 Id. at 101; 392 U.S. at 119-20 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
175 Id. at 102.
176 Id. at 103-05.
177 See, e.g., Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. Rav. 450 (1970).
178 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
179 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
180 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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government.' "181 Accordingly, the Court ruled that because the plain-
tiff's interest as a taxpayer was "undifferentiated and common to all
members of the public" he lacked standing.182
Similarly, in Schlesinger, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs, su-
ing as taxpayers and citizens, lacked standing to raise the claim that the
incompatability clause of Article I, § 6 "renders a member of Congress
ineligible to hold a commission in the Armed Forces Reserve during his
continuance in office." 18 3 Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion con-
cluded that "the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional gov-
ernance" was not sufficient to justify standing. 84 A citizen or taxpayer
cannot claim standing if his or her adversely affected interest is "held in
common by all members of the public." 185
After Richardson and Schlesinger, taxpayer and citizen standing in
federal court is virtually eliminated. Under current law, it appears that
a taxpayer only has standing if he or she alleges a challenge to expendi-
tures based on the Establishment Clause. 18 6 As such, a taxpayer may
not sue to recover money for the government in cases of fraud and cor-
ruption. Because the injury to any single taxpayer is undifferentiated
from that suffered by all others, standing is barred. The prudential rule
against plaintiffs asserting a generalized grievance precludes taxpayer
class actions unless statutory authority exists for such litigation.
B. THE ABSENCE OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR TAXPAYER CLASS
ACTIONS
Unfortunately, there is currently no statutory authority for tax-
payer class actions against fraud and corruption. The only potential
basis for such suits, the False Claims Act, 8 7 has been restricted by legis-
lative and judicial action so that it no longer provides a realistic oppor-
tunity for private litigation.
Congress enacted the False Claims Act in 1863 in response to wide-
spread fraud and corruption during the Civil War. 188 Passage of the
Act was motivated by revelations of significant fraud perpetrated by
contractors supplying material for the war effort and by government
officials who received substantial bribes and kickbacks.189 To better de-
181 418 U.S. at 175 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 106).
182 Id. at 176-77.
183 Id. at 209.
184 Id. at 217.
185 Id. at 220.
186 Note, supra note 106, at 425.
187 31 U.S.C. § 231, et seq. (1976).
188 Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696, codif&din Revised Statutes §§ 3490-94, 5438.
189 The Congressional debates over the False Claims Act were not extensive. They are
found in CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 952-58 (1863).
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ter fraud, the Act provided that anyone found to have submitted false
claims to the government would be liable for double the amount of
damages sustained and a forfeiture of $2,000 for each false claim submit-
ted. 19 Liability was created in three instances: submission for payment
or approval of false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims against the United
States government; use of fraudulent or fictitious statements to obtain
approval of a claim; and conspiracies to obtain government payment of
a false claim.1l '
The Act also provided authority for qui tam actions. That is, pri-
vate citizens could bring suits against those alleged to have submitted
false claims and, if successful, would receive a percentage of the amount
recovered.192 The Act's legislative history indicates "that Congress
chose to permit enforcement by private citizens, as well as by the gov-
ernment, because of a belief that public officials, many of whom were
deeply involved in the corrupt practices complained of during the Civil
War era, would fail to initiate actions for reasons of selfish advan-
tage."' 93 As a result of its qui tam provisions, the False Claims Act was
commonly referred to as the "Informer's Act."
The False Claims Act remained unchanged until Congress
amended its qui tam provisions in 1943. The 1943 amendments were
largely a reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in United States ex rel,
Marcus v. Hess. 194 In Hess, the defendants, electrical contractors, were
charged with defrauding Public Works Administration funded projects.
Through bid-rigging and collusion, the contractors were alleged to have
cheated the government out of more than $100,000.195 The contractors
were indicted and entered pleas of nolo contendere. Soon thereafter, a
private plaintiff copied the government's indictment and brought suit
against the defendant under the False Claims Act. The trial court ruled
190 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976); R.S. 3490. For a discussion of how forfeitures are to be calcu-
lated, see United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976).
191 R.S. § 5438 provided liability for:
Every person who makes or causes to be made, or presents or causes to be presented for
payment or approval .. .any claim upon or against the government of the United
States, or any department or officer thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or
fraudulent, or who, for the purpose of obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment or
approval of such claim, makes, uses, or causes to be made or used any false bill, receipt,
voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit or deposition, knowing the same to
contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry, or who enters into any agree-
ment, combination or conspiracy to defraud the government. . . by obtaining or aiding
to obtain the payment or allowance of any false or fraudulent claims. . ..
See 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976).
192 R.S. § 3491.
193 Note, supra note 4, at 453 n.32.
194 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
195 Id. at 539-40.
1506 [Vol. 72
TAXPA YER REMEDY
in favor of the plaintiff and awarded a judgment of $315,000, $203,000
for double damages and $112,000 for 56 forfeitures at $2,000 each.
The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that such
civil liability violated the constitutional proscription against double
jeopardy. 196 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, af-
firming the district court's decision. The Court held "that there was no
double jeopardy since the former governmental action was criminal and
the instant qui tam action was civil and remedial." 197 Justice Jackson
dissented arguing that it was absurd to allow plaintiffs to bring suit and
recover simply by copying an indictment previously filed by the
government. 198
Immediately after the Court announced the Hess decision, the Jus-
tice Department asked Congress to amend the False Claims act to bar
suits based on information possessed by the government.' 99 Congress
quickly amended the Act's qui tam provisions so as to virtually eliminate
citizen suits. Most importantly, Congress established a jurisdictional
limitation on private litigation. The False Claims Act was amended to
provide that:
The court shall have no jurisdiction to proceed with any such suit ...
whenever it shall be made to appear that such suit was based upon evi-
dence or information in the possession of the United States, or any agency,
officer, of employee thereof, at the time such suit was brought.2°°
The amendment "was clearly aimed at limiting the use of the qui
tam provisions of the statute."'20 1 In part, the restriction was designed to
prevent "races to the courthouse" by private litigants copying indict-
ments in the hope of obtaining an easy recovery.20 2 The legislative his-
tory of the amendment reveals that there was even fear that underworld
figures would file qui tam suits to gain a quick profit. The chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that "today [qui tam suits under
the False Claims Act have] become one of the worst sources of racketeer-
ing since the days of Al Capone in the Prohibition Era. '20 3 In part, too,
qui tam suits were eliminated because the Justice Department believed
that civil litigation based on the same information as criminal indict-
ments would hinder prosecutions by giving defendant's discovery of the
196 127 F.2d 233 (3d Cir.), reo'd, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
197 Note, supra note 115, at 435 n.186.
198 317 U.S. at 558 (Jackson, J. dissenting).
199 89 CONG. REC. 7571 (1943).
200 31 U.S.C. § 232(c) (1976).
201 Comment, supra note 108, at 793.
202 See United States ex rel. Bayarsky v. Brooks, 110 F. Supp. 175, 179-80 (D.NJ. 1953).
203 89 CONG. REC. 7571 (1943).
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government's case. 20 4
Federal courts have strictly interpreted the restrictions on qui tam
suits contained in the 1943 amendments. For example, the jurisdic-
tional limitation has been held to apply even where the information had
been furnished to the United States by the person who later instituted
the qui tam suit.20 5 Similarly, a qui tam plaintiff who was previously a
government employee and acquired information in the course of his or
her duties, may not bring suit. This bar exists even when the employee
brought the facts to the attention of his superiors and no governmental
action was taken.206
Furthermore, the court does not have jurisdiction over a citizen's
suit if anyone in the government knows of the information on which the
suit is based. 20 7 It is irrelevant that the government does not plan to
utilize the information or bring suit. So long as someone in the govern-
ment knows the information, all private citizens are forever barred from
initiating litigation.
This provision, and its restrictive interpretation, virtually eliminat-
ed qui tam suits. "It is hard to imagine a situation where a private plain-
tiff will learn enough about the government's dealing with a defendant
to bring an action before the government itself learns of the informa-
tion. '208 The False Claims Act is not an authorization for taxpayer ac-
tions against fraud and corruption because it is "unlikely that more than
a very few civilian plaintiffs will acquire enough sufficiently solid infor-
mation to justify the expense of filing an action without having the in-
formation on which the suit is based also being known by the
government. '20 9
One recent example of the effect of the jurisdictional bar is United
States v. Burmah Oil Co. Ltd.2 1 0 Plaintiffs alleged that a fraudulent appli-
cation to the Maritime Administration induced the government to pay
out millions of dollars in construction subsidies to Burmah Oil Com-
pany. The court dismissed the plaintiffs case on the grounds that
"[j]urisdiction is defeated by the government's possession of the informa-
tion."2 1' The court held that the public service in assembling, organiz-
204 Comment, supra note 108, 793 n.85; see also United States v. Pittman, 151 F.2d 851, 853
(5th Cir. 1945).
205 United States v. Aster, 176 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aJ'd, 275 F. 2d (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 894 (1960).
206 See United States ex rel. McCans v. Armour & Co., 146 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1956),
aj'd, 254 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 358 U.S. 834, rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 901 (1958).
207 Comment, supra note 108, at 793.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 794.
210 558 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1977), ceri. denied, 99 S. Ct. 511 (1978).
211 558 F.2d at 46.
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ing and integrating the information in the government's possession is
not sufficient to create jurisdiction. The citizen's suit to recover money
for the United States was dismissed even though the government has
never taken action to recover the money.
Furthermore, even in the unlikely circumstance that a plaintiff files
suit based on information the government does not possess, the 1943
amendments authorize the United States to intervene and assume full
control over the litigation. 212 The amended False Claims act requires a
plaintiff to give notice to the Attorney General, including "disclosure in
writing of substantially all evidence and information . . .material to
the effective prosecution of such suit. '2 1 3 The United States then may
enter the action and completely supersede the qui tam plaintiff without
being bound by anything previously done in the litigation.
Thus, the 1943 amendments to the False Claims Act, and its judi-
cial constructions, make the statute "an ineffective tool for the civilian
plaintiff."214 The Act simply cannot be used effectively as a basis for
taxpayer actions against fraud and corruption.
III. ESTABLISHING A TAXPAYER REMEDY: A SUGGESTED
LEGISLATIVE APPROACH
Although taxpayer class actions would be a valuable weapon
against fraud and corruption, standing barriers preclude such suits ab-
sent explicit statutory authority. This section outlines a proposal for leg-
islative authorization of private litigation to recover money for the
government. The first part of the section establishes Congressional
power to create taxpayer standing by statute. The second part details
what the statutory provisions should contain. Finally, the possible ob-
jections to allowing this type of taxpayer litigation are analyzed.
A. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO CREATE TAXPAYER STANDING BY
STATUTE
As discussed earlier, taxpayer litigation is barred by the rule
preventing suits involving generalized grievances. 2 1 5 The rule against
cases presenting generalized grievances is not a constitutional principle
based on Article III, but rather is prudential. 21 6 Congress may, by stat-
ute, overcome the standing barrier, because it is well established that
Congress may permit litigation by one "who otherwise would be barred
212 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1976).
213 Id.
214 Comment, supra note 108, at 794.
215 See discussion accompanying notes 165-86 supra.
216 Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. at 100.
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by the prudential standing rules. '2 1 7
Thus, Congress may grant standing to taxpayers to initiate litiga-
tion on behalf of the public interest where otherwise such actions would
be precluded. Even Justice Harlan, advocating a restrictive interpreta-
tion of standing, noted in his dissent in Flast v. Cohen that "individual
litigants have standing to represent the public interest, despite their lack
of economic or other personal interests, if Congress has appropriately
authorized such suits. ' 2 18 This notion is hardly novel because it long
has been recognized that "there is nothing constitutionally prohibiting
Congress from empowering any person, official or not, to institute a pro-
ceeding . . . , even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public inter-
est."'2 1 9 Simply stated, because standing principles are, in large part,
motivated by considerations of separation of powers, the "question
whether the litigant is a 'proper party to request an adjudication of a
particular issue' . . . is one within the power of Congress to
determine." 220
Congress, of course, may not abrogate the Article III standing bar-
riers.221 Taxpayer litigation pursuant to Congressional authorization,
however, would fulfill all of the constitutional standing requirements.
First, "injury in fact" would be present in such taxpayer suits. A statute
allowing individuals to sue to recover money for the government would
create a legal right on the part of all taxpayers to have government
money spent without fraud.222 Therefore, a citizen seeking to recover
money against the government would allege a sufficient injury because
"Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which
creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the stat-
ute. ' 223 Under the current standing law, "someone is 'injured in fact' by
an action for purposes of Article III if the person has a statutory right to
complain of the action in federal court. '224
217 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 501; Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S.
at 100. For a discussion of the rationale for congressional authority to create standing, see
Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Pleafor Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 665-80
(1977).
218 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 131 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
219 Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943).
220 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 732 n.3 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 100).
221 Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. at 100; cf. Brubaker-Board of
Education, School District No. 149, Cook County, Illinois, 502 F.2d 973, 989 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1974) ("Congress may not by its legislation override the Constitution.").
222 Courts frequently have held that public officials have a fiduciary duty to the citizens
they serve. United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1362 (4th Cir.), vacatedon other grounds,
602 F.2d 653 (1979); United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 305-06 (1910).
223 Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973). See also Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. at 500 ("The actual or threatened injury required by Article III may exist solely by
virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing'.").
224 L. TRIBE, supra note 162, at 80. See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 402 U.S. at 732 n.3.
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It is irrelevant that the injury would be common to all members of
the public. In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatoy Agency Proceed-
ings12 25 the Supreme Court upheld the standing of a group of citizens to
challenge an Interstate Commerce Commission decision to raise freight
rates. The plaintiff's contended that higher freight rates would discour-
age recycling, increasing pollution and sacrificing aesthetic beauty. This
injury was held to be sufficient to create standing, despite the fact that
virtually any citizen could have been a potential plaintiff:
[A]lI persons who utilize the scenic resources of the country, and indeed all
who breathe its air, could claim harm similar to that alleged by the envi-
ronmental groups here. But we have already made it clear that standing is
not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury. 226
Because fraud against government ultimately translates into higher
taxes, every taxpayer is "adversely affected financially by an illegal pub-
lic disbursement." 227 Hence, a plaintiff suing pursuant to Congressional
authorization of taxpayer suits would meet the constitutional standard
for "injury in fact."
Furthermore, the other Article III standing requirement, redres-
sability, would be satisfied. A plaintiff would allege that the defendant's
fraud has caused the government to lose funds which but for the illicit act
would be available to be properly spent.228 The Court's relief would
redress the injury by returning the misgotten funds to the Federal
Treasury.
There are many precedents for Congress' authority to create stand-
ing by statute. For example, the 1968 Civil Rights Act provides that
"any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory hous-
ing practice" may sue in federal court. 229 In Trafticante .Metropolitan Lfe
Insurance Co. '230 a group of white tenants sued, claiming that the defend-
ant's discriminatory renting policy deprived them of the social and pro-
fessional benefits of living in an integrated community. The Supreme
Court explicitly upheld the plaintiffs' standing on the basis of Congress'
authorization for suit in the Civil Rights Act.23 '
Numerous other statutes create citizen standing to sue in fe&ral
225 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
226 Id. at 687. SCRAP is not inconsistent with Richardson and Schlesinger because the latter
cases involved citizen and taxpayer standing which is barred by the rule against generalized
grievances, whereas SCRAP involved a claim of a specific injury to the plaintiffs, albeit one
potentially shared by the entire country.
227 Davis, supra note 165, at 632.
228 See Duke Power Co. v. Caroline Environmental States Group, Inc., 438 U.S. at 80-81
(but for causation meets the Article III requirement).
229 Civil Rights Act of 1968 § 801(a); 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1976).
230 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
231 Id. at 209-10.
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court. The Freedom of Information Act allows any person whose re-
quest for information has been denied to sue in federal district court to
compel the government to release the requested documents. 232 Under
the Clean Air Act "any person may commence a civil action on his own
behalf. . .against the Administrator [of the Environmental Protection
Agency] where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform
any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the
Administrator. 2 33 The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 author-
ized "any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of Pres-
ident of the United States . . . [to] initiate such actions as may be
appropriate to construe the constitutionality of any provision of the
Act." 234
In all of these statutes, citizens who share an injury common to all
members of the public are given authority to sue in federal court. Not a
single statute granting citizen or taxpayer standing ever has been struck
down. Because the bar against taxpayer litigation is prudential, and not
constitutional, Congress clearly has the authority to enact legislation au-
thorizing taxpayer suits to recover money for the government in in-
stances of fraud and corruption.
B. PROPOSED STATUTORY PROVISIONS AUTHORIZING TAXPAYER
CLASS ACTIONS TO RECOVER MONEY AND PROPERTY FOR
THE GOVERNMENT
The statute creating authority for taxpayer litigation to recover
money and property for the government should contain provisions set-
ting forth the cause of action, jurisdiction, the relationship of the citi-
zen's suit to the government, and remedies. Each of these areas merits
separate consideration.
. The Cause of Action
Currently, many statutes allow the United States to sue to recover
government money and property from those who are not entitled to pos-
232 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976). See, e.g., Alfred A. Knopfv. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1367
(4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1976) ("any citizen now can compel the production
of information").
233 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979). See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d
165 (2d Cir. 1976) (purpose of the standing grant is to permit plaintiff's to sue without having
suffered a direct injury in fact). See also Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a)(2) (1976), which has been interpreted as creating standing the same as under the
Clean Air Act. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 699 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
234 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a) (1976). The Supreme Court mentioned this provision in Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1976), where it construed the constitutionality of the Act, but did
not address the constitutionality of the standing provision.
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sess it. For example, the False Claims Act,2 35 the Anti-Kickback Act,2 36
and the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, 237
create civil causes of action to recover government funds.
Rather than create a new cause of action for taxpayer suits, the
most effective approach is to grant taxpayer's standing to sue under ex-
isting laws. A law enacting a new cause of action would present numer-
ous problems of definition, both in drafting the statute and in
subsequent judicial interpretation. A bill to establish a new cause of
action would have to define who may be liable; the bases for liability;
and the mental state required for liability. By relying on existing statu-
tory causes of action, the drafting problems are avoided, because each of
these elements have been defined and case law has developed interpret-
ing them.238
Thus, the statute simply would establish authority for taxpayer
standing to sue to recover money or property for the government under
any statute which would allow such suits by the United States Attorney
General. The taxpayer would have standing in federal court if he or she
alleged grounds sufficient to state a cause of action under any statute
which would authorize such suit to be brought by the federal govern-
ment. The taxpayer plaintiff would sue on behalf of the United States
of America to recover money for it.239 The only exception would be for
tax cases. Because of the complexity of the tax laws and the need for
uniform enforcement, the government should not allow private citizens
to bring suits to recover tax deficiencies for the government. In fact, the
existence of a large enforcement agency, the Internal Revenue Service,
makes taxpayer standing less essential to enforcement than it is in fraud
cases.
2. jurisdictional Provisions
Standing to bring a civil suit in cases of government fraud should
be granted to any taxpayer of the United States. That is, if a complaint
alleges that the plaintiff paid any taxes to the United States government
within the previous year, standing exists. Though the grant of standing
could be drafted more expansively to allow any citizen to sue, it would
be best to restrict jurisdiction to taxpayer suits. Although non-taxpayers
235 31 U.S.C. § 231, etseq. (1976).
236 41 U.S.C. § 51 (1976).
237 Pub. L. No. 95-142; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 nn.(b)(2), 1396h(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
238 For example, there are dozens of cases interpreting each element of the False Claims
Act. Supreme Court cases include United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976); United
States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228 (1968); United States v. McNinch, 756 U.S. 595
(1958).
239 Of course, the taxpayer bringing suit would receive a portion of the money recovered.
See discussion accompanying notes 243-44 in]fa.
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are arguably injured, to insure that the constitutional standing require-
ment for "injury in fact" is met, jurisdiction should be limited to taxpay-
ers. Given the large number of taxpayers, this limitation on standing
hardly should prove restrictive. Since wasted government funds injure
every taxpayer, any taxpayer, individual, partnership, or corporation,
would be entitled to bring suit in federal court.
Venue should exist in any district in which the plaintiff resides, or
where the fraud occurred, or in Washington, D.C. Since the purpose of
the law is to facilitate suits by private citizens, it would be self-defeating
to force plaintiffs to travel long distances to conduct litigation.
Subject matter jurisdiction will be created by the statute establish-
ing authority for taxpayer suits in federal court. There should be an
amount in controversy requirement. The amount in controversy should
be set so that the federal courts are not flooded with insignificant fraud
cases. Accordingly, it is suggested that the court shall have jurisdiction
only if there is an allegation that the government has lost more than
$50,000 in money or property. This figure is arbitrary, but seems appro-
priate as a dividing line between major and minor losses.
3. Relationshz to the Government
Since the government will continue to bring civil, as well as crimi-
nal actions, it is necessary to define the relationship between the tax-
payer litigation and government enforcement efforts. First, the statute
should provide that taxpayers do not have standing if there is a pending
civil action brought by the United States against the same defendant
and based on the same transaction. Because the purpose of citizen suits
is to increase resources devoted to enforcement, there is no point in al-
lowing duplicative litigation.
Second, the statute must allow the government to act to protect its
criminal case. Since discovery in criminal cases is far more restrictive
than in civil actions, the government fears that concurrent civil and
criminal litigation will jeopardize criminal prosecutions as defendants
use civil discovery to learn the details of the government's case. 240 This
problem can be prevented by allowing the government to request that
the district court grant a continuance in the civil proceedings until the
completion of the criminal prosecutions. The government would be re-
quired to demonstrate why in the particular case concurrent proceed-
ings would prejudice the criminal litigation.
Finally, there is the question of whether the government should be
able to intervene and assume complete control over the taxpayer's ac-
tion. Of course, if the plaintiff does not object, there would be no prob-
240 See Comment, supra note 108, at 798.
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lem with the government replacing the taxpayer as plaintiff. If,
however, the taxpayer wishes to remain as plaintiff, the United States
should be able to assume control of the litigation, but only by demon-
strating to the district court strong grounds for the government replac-
ing the taxpayer as plaintiff. The substitution of the United States as
plaintiff should be made only upon order of the district court and
should be conditioned upon the government's diligent and good faith
pursuit of the litigation. If subsequent to the government's assumption
of control over the litigation, the taxpayer plaintiff believes that the gov-
ernment is not handling the litigation in good faith, the plaintiff should
be able to petition the district court to be reinstated as plaintiff.24 1
Such authority would prevent the government from assuming con-
trol over cases to have them dismissed, as could happen in cases of cor-
rupt enforcement. At the same time, it would allow government
intervention in situations where that would be desirable to increase
prosecutorial resources and to coordinate litigation. Thus, the statute
should provide that the government may intervene and replace the tax-
payer only if there is either consent from the original plaintiff or an
order of the court based on the showing of good cause for the
substitution.
. Remedies
The statutes which create the causes of action also provide for the
basic remedies. For example, the False Claims Act provides for recovery
of double the amount of damages sustained by the government and a
$2,000 forfeiture for each false claim. 242 The statute creating taxpayer
standing must provide for payment to the plaintiff of a share of the
funds recovered, since it is the chance of recovery that motivates private
citizens to investigate and prosecute fraud.243
The share to be given to the plaintiff should be set high enough to
encourage citizen enforcement, but not so high as to create a windfall.
At the very least, in successful suits, taxpayers should recover all costs
they have incurred in pursuing the matter. Additionally, taxpayers
should receive a fraction of the sum returned to the Treasury. Obvi-
ously, no formula can exist to precisely set the percentage to be given to
the plaintiff. The court should have discretion to determine the size of
241 This is similar to the traditional qui tam action "where [if] the government takes over
prosecution. . and fails to prosecute diligently, the private plaintiff can resume command
and prosecute, thereby preventing loss of his rights by the government's improper handling of
his case." Id. at 785.
242 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976).
243 Note, supra note 4, at 451 n.22.
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the plaintiffs recovery. 244 The statute should specify that the court
must consider such factors as the difficulty of the suit, the duration of
the plaintiffs involvement (did the plaintiff just initiate the action or
did the plaintiff conduct the entire litigation), the importance of the
matter (precedential value, the magnitude of the fraud, etc.), and the
size of the total recovery. Based on these factors, the court should award
the plaintiff between five and twenty-five percent of the total sum re-
turned to the Treasury. Thus, all plaintiffs initiating successful litiga-
tion will be assured of recovering their costs and a sizeable reward for
their efforts.
C. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO AUTHORITY FOR TAXPAYER STANDING
Three major arguments can be advanced against taxpayer suits to
recover money for the government: court overload, interference with
Justice Department enforcement efforts, and strike suits by unscrupu-
lous plaintiffs. Upon examination, however, it is apparent that each of
these objections lacks merit.
A major justification for restrictive standing doctrines is to limit the
number of potential plaintiffs bringing suit in federal court.245 Oppo-
nents of taxpayer standing argue that if such suits were permitted, there
would be a flood of litigation swamping the federal judiciary.246 This
fear seems greatly exaggerated. Past experience with taxpayer suits at
both the state and federal levels refutes the notion that court overload
would result. As Professor Kenneth Culp Davis explains:
The figment about floods of litigation if taxpayer suits are allowed is de-
monstrably false. Nearly all states allow taxpayers to challenge disburse-
ments, and anyone who cares to look at the facts can readily find that
taxpayer suits are few, not numerous. Supreme Court law from 1899 to
1923 allowed taxpayers to challenge federal disbursements, with no result-
ing flood of litigation .... 247
Logically, it is difficult to imagine that the number of citizen initiated
suits against frauds of greater than $50,000 will be so great as to over-
whelm the court system.
Furthermore, the court overload argument assumes that the cost to
the Treasury of increased suits will be greater than the benefits returned.
It is likely that taxpayer suits to recover money for the government will
244 See Comment, note 108, at 800 ("[o]n balance ... reliance on trial judges to set the
share of the judgement awarded to the private plaintiff seems the best way of insuring that
the reward plays the proper role in qui tam actions").
245 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 130 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing for restricting
taxpayer standing on the grounds that "public actions ... may involve important hazards
for the contrived effectiveness of the federal judiciary").
246 Wall Street Journal, Nov. 29, 1971, at 1, col. 4.
247 Davis, supra note 165, at 634.
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more than pay for themselves. Frivolous suits can be dismissed by the
courts at an early stage in the proceedings.2 4s Successful suits will return
a minimum of $37,500 to the United States Treasury.2 49 The cost of the
judiciary's handling one case is certainly a fraction of this amount.
While, of course, not every suit will be successful, there is every reason to
believe that the total amount recovered will far exceed the costs to the
court system. And if increased enforcement does succeed in deterring
fraud,250 that is an additional financial gain for the government justify-
ing the costs of taxpayer suits.
A second objection to authority for taxpayer suits is that such litiga-
tion would interfere with the government's exclusive control over en-
forcement efforts. The Justice Department has argued that it alone
should prosecute, criminally and civilly, violations of federal law.25 1 In
part, this argument "appears to reflect a desire to purposely avoid prose-
cution of some violations. ' 252 Yet, it is difficult to imagine a situation in
which fraud against the government should not be remedied at least by
recovery of the illicitly gained sum. If the government fails to act, citi-
zen suits should be welcomed. As one commentator notes:
If, on the one hand, the government declined to act in a particular case
because of lack of manpower, there would seem no reason why the govern-
ment would not welcome the initiation of a suit by a qui lam plaintiff. In
such a situation, the qui lam plaintiff could maintain the suit on behalf of
the government, and yet the government would collect three-fourths of the
amount recovered. . . . If, however, the government declined to prose-
cute for corrupt or political reasons, permitting a qui tam plaintiff to initi-
ate proceedings would implement the purpose of the statute.253
In part, too, the Justice Department's opposition to citizen suits is
based on a fear that such litigation would interfere with criminal en-
forcement efforts. As explained above, civil actions give defendants far
greater discovery tools than are available in criminal cases. 254 Thus, the
government fears that taxpayer suits will hamper prosecutions by en-
abling defendants to use civil discovery to gain information which other-
wise would not be available.255 This problem is easily dealt with by
248 Hearings on S 3005, Citizoes Right to Standing in Federal Courts Act of 1978, Before the Senate
Judidav Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 53-59 (1978) (dialogue between Senator Metzenbaum
and Erwin Griswold).
249 Under the proposed statute there is a $50,000 amount in controversy requirement and
a maximum recovery for the plaintiff of twenty-five percent, assuring the government of at
least $37,000 for each successful suit.
250 See discussion accompanying notes 134-35 supra.
251 See United States cx rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 547 n.l1 (1943).
252 Comment, supra note 108, at 797.
253 Note, supra note 4, at 473 n.130.
254 See discussion accompanying note 240 supra.
255 See Comment, supra note 108, at 798.
1981] 1517
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY
including a provision within the statute permitting the government to
request a delay in the civil litigation until completion of the criminal
proceedings.2 56
Likewise, statutory provisions can eliminate the fear that private
plaintiffs will prejudice the government by incompetently handling suits
which would then, because of res judicata, bar subsequent Justice De-
partment civil actions.2 57 The statute creating authority for taxpayer
standing requires the plaintiff to notify the Justice Department at the
time suit is initiated. Additionally, it allows the Justice Department to
intervene and even control the litigation to insure that the suit is han-
dled effectively.
The final objection to taxpayer suits is that "strike suits" would
result. That is, plaintiffs would initiate litigation and then quickly "set-
tle the suit for the amount that severely prejudices the government inter-
est."' 258 This fear is not purely hypothetical. When qui tam suits were
allowed in England, "the filing of a[n]. . action was often followed by
a collusive settlement for a nominal amount, designed to bar the govern-
ment from subsequent prosecution for an appropriate recovery. '259
This practice, however, can be made virtually impossible by includ-
ing within the statute a provision preventing dismissal or settlement of a
suit without the consent of the judge and the United States govern-
ment.2 60 Again, the ability of the Justice Department to intervene as-
sures that the case will not be improperly handled or prematurely
settled. Furthermore, a preliminary hearing, held early in the proceed-
ings, can prevent strike suits by insuring that there is sufficient reason to
believe that the litigation should continue.
The objections to taxpayer suits to recover money for the govern-
ment are unfounded. Careful drafting of the statute can prevent the
anticipated problems from ever occurring.
IV. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, fraud against the government is probably inevita-
ble. The sheer size of federal expenditures makes it virtually impossible
to ever eliminate all corruption. Nonetheless, the political realities of
the 1980s make it imperative that new and innovative solutions be tried
to combat fraud. Every dollar lost to graft is one less that can be spent
for useful ends. Every example of fraud is a potential argument against
256 See Section 4(b) of the proposed statute infra.
257 See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 145, at 306-07 (res judicata as a justification for restrict-
ing standing).
258 Comment, supra note 108, at 797.
259 Id.
260 Id.; Note, supra note 114, at 906.
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the program itself. In this era of budget austerity, legislation to decrease
fraud must be given a high priority.
There, of course, is no single action which by itself will succeed in
dramatically reducing fraud. A plethora of approaches to various as-
pects of the problems must be attempted. Recent actions, such as the
creation of Inspector Generals within Cabinet level agencies261 and de-
signing programs to minimize opportunities for fraud,262 are important
steps. But these actions are simply not enough in light of the magnitude
of fraud and corruption. New weapons must be added to the arsenal.
One way to substantially increase enforcement efforts is to allow
taxpayers to bring suits to recover money for the government. Over 500
years ago, the qui tam action was devised as a way to supplement inade-
quate prosecutorial resources. Its fundamental concept-having private
citizens bring civil suits where the government fails to do so-seems per-
fectly suited to America in the late twentieth century. At minimal cost,
a multitude of private attorneys general can be unleashed. Funds will
be recovered that otherwise would be lost. In the long term, increased
enforcement can deter future fraud. While it is difficult to predict the
effect of any law, there is every reason to believe that legislation author-
izing taxpayer suits could significantly reduce fraud and corruption.
APPENDIX
Proposed statute to establish taxpayer standing to bring civil suit to
recover money for the government in instances of fraud and corruption.
Section 1: Legislative purpose. It is the purpose of Congress to recog-
nize that each taxpayer of the United States has an interest in the
proper disbursement of federal monies 'and in recovering funds lost
through fraud and corruption against the government. Civil enforce-
ment actions brought by individual United States taxpayers are in-
tended to substantially aid government civil and criminal prosecution of
fraud.
Section 2: Actions by private citizens to enforce federal laws. Any tax-
payer of the United States may file civil suit in federal district court to
recover money or property for the government under and statute which
authorizes the Attorney General of the United States to bring such suit.
a) Definition of taxpayer. Taxpayer of the United States shall be defined
261 Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101, 5 Appx. I el seq.
262 ECONOMIC OFFENSES: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7 (1977); see, e.g., Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-142 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 26, 42 U.S.C. (1976)).
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as a person who has paid any tax to the United States Treasury within
twelve months of filing suit.
b) Exception. No suit may be brought by any taxpayer to enforce the
Internal Revenue Code of the United States.
Section 3: Jurisdiction and Venue.
a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
brought by taxpayers of the United States to recover money or prop-
erty for the government under any statute which authorizes the Attor-
ney General of the United States to bring such suit, and where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000, exclusive of
interest and costs.
b) Venue shall be in any district in which the plaintiff resides, or where
the fraud occurred, or where the defendant resides, or in the District
of Columbia.
Section 4: Relationship of Private suits to the United States
Government.
a) Notice to the Attorney General. Whenever any such suit shall be
brought by any person under this Act, notice of the pendency of such
suit shall be given to the United States by serving upon the United
States Attorney for the district in which such suit shall have been
brought a copy of the bill of complaint and by sending by registered
or certified mail, to the Attorney General of the United States at
Washington, District of Columbia, a copy of such bill.
b) The Attorney General or his designee may intervene in any such suit
for the purpose of requesting that the suit be continued until comple-
tion of pending criminal proceedings. The court shall grant such con-
tinuances upon the showing of good cause to believe concurrent civil
proceedings would prejudice the government's criminal prosecution.
c) The Attorney General or his designee may intervene in any such suit
and replace the taxpayer who initiated suit as plaintiff upon approval
of the original plaintiff or upon order of the district court. If subse-
quent to the government's assumption of control over the litigation,
the taxpayer plaintiff alleges that the government is not diligently pur-
suing the litigation in good faith, the taxpayer plaintiff may petition
the district court to be reinstated as plaintiff in the litigation.
d) Such suits brought under this Act shall not be dismissed except upon
approval of the Attorney General or his designee and the district
court.
Section 5: Award to taxpayer plaintiffs. In any such suit, the court may
award to the person who brought such suit, out of the proceeds of such
suit or any settlement of any claim involved therein, an amount which
in the judgment of the court is fair and reasonable compensation to such
person, together with reimbursement for all costs incurred in bringing
suit. The court in determining the award, shall consider the difficulty of
the suit, the efforts of the plaintiff, the importance of the action, and the
size of the recovery. In no event shall the amount given to a plaintiff in
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a successful suit be less than five percent nor more than twenty-five per-
cent of the amount recovered, exclusive of costs. All other funds shall be
returned to the United States.
